The conference was organized by CREI jointly with the Caixa de Manresa. The program was prepared by a scientific committee, chaired by professor Luis Corchon, (UPF, Barcelona and U. Carlos III, Madrid), and formed by professors Claude d'Aspremont, CORE (U. Catholique de Louvain), Michele Boldrin, (U. Carlos III, Madrid), Xavier Calsamiglia, (UPF, Barcelona), Egbert Dierker, (U. of Vienne), Birgit Grodal, (U. of Copenhaguen), Michel Lebreton, (GREQAM, Marseille), Andreu Mas-Colell, (UPF, Barcelona) and Walter Trockel, (U. of Bielefeld).
The conference presentations were focused on the recent advances of the General Equilibrium Theory. Issues discussed were the role of alternative ways to coordinate economic decisions, the effects of the market structure and the consequences of asymmetric information. Elements of bounded rationality and fairness considerations were introduced as constraints on the behavior of agents.
INCOMPLETE MARKETS
Sunspots and Incomplete Markets with Real Assets
.N. Laguecir (BETA, Strassbourg).
A Remark on Rational Expectations Equilibria with Incomplete Markets and Real Assets.
H. Stahn (BETA, Strassbourg)
LARGE ECONOMIES
Manipulation-Proof Equilibrium in Atomless Economies with Commodity Differentiation
C. Herves (U. Vigo), E. Moreno and M. R. Pascoa (U. Nova de Lisboa)
Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies.
B. Ellickson (U. California, L.A.), B. Grodal (U. Copenhagen), S. Scotchmer (U. California, Berkeley) and W. Zame (U. California, L.A.).
A Note on the Core of a Continuum Economy with Infinitely Many Commodities
C. Herves (U. Vigo), E. Moreno (U. Nova de Lisboa), C. Moreno (U. Carlos III, Madrid) and M. R. Pascoa (U. Nova de Lisboa).
MATCHING
Unemployment, Optimal Waiting and Queues
C. Carrera, A. Rodrigo and M. Vazquez (U. Complutense, Madrid)
A Simple Model of Multiple Equilibria Based on Risk
J. Costain (Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona).
MONEY
Expectations, Coordination and Business Cycle Stabilization Through Monetary Policy
S. Gauthier (DELTA, Paris).
On the Positive Fundamental Value of Money with Short-Sale Constraints: A Comment on two Close Examples
E. Gimenez-Fernandez (U. Vigo).
AGGREGATION
The Monotonicity of Individual and Market Demand.
J. K.-H. Quah (Oxford)
Heterogeneous Households´ Intertemporal Characteristics and the Aggregation Problem
I. Maret (BETA, Strasbourg)
SATURDAY, MAY 23, 1998
MARKET GAMES
Walrasian Allocation without Price-Taking Behavior
R. Serrano (Brown U., Providence).
Bid-Ask Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market Makers
R. Calcagno and S. Lovo (CORE, Louvain)
Product Differentiation and Market Power
E. Dierker and H. Dierker (U. Vienna)
SOCIAL SECURITY
Demography and Pensions. A General Equilibrium Analysis of Spain
M Montero (U. Vigo).
Voting on Social Security Reforms with Heterogeneous Agents
J.C. Conesa (U. Barcelona) and D. Krueger (U. Minnesota)
FINANCE AND MORAL HAZARD
A Sequence of Pareto Improving Financial Innovations
C. Hara (U. Cambridge).
Moral Hazard and Nominal, Linear Financial Contracts
A. Citanna (Carnegie Mellon U.)
Redistribution as a Selection Device
H. P. Grüner (U. Bonn)
DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
On the Incompatibility between Chaos and Patience
C. Guerrero (U. Alicante)
Time Reversibility in overlapping Generations Economies under Extrinsic Uncertainty
J. Davila (U. Autonoma de Barcelona)