The program committee was formed by Michael Bordo (Rutgers University, University of Cambridge and NBER) and Hans-Joachim Voth (CREI, UPF and CEPR). The conference brought together practitioners from the IMF and central banks, and from all parts of academia. The key benefit was a two-way exchange between the two groups. With dangerous financial imbalances in the world financial system, the practitioners uniformly described as valuable the historical depth of the programme, giving them a better sense of the full range of possible outcomes of crises and their origins. Academics benefitted from insights into the key questions that policymakers are asking today, especially in terms of the transmission mechanism for financial crises and the role of sovereign debt.
June 8, 2007
International Risk Sharing and Diversification
1. Fernando Broner and Jaume Ventura, "Globalization and Risk Sharing"
2. Jean Imbs, Paolo Mauro, "Pooling Risk Among Countries"
International Transmissions
3. Guillermo Felices, Christian Grisse, and Jing Yang, "International Financial Transmission: Emerging and Mature Markets"
4. Kris Mitchener and Marc Weidenmier, "The Baring Crisis and the Great Latin American Meltdown of the 1890s"
Sovereign Debt Crises
5. Bernardo Guimaraes, "Optimal External Debt and Default"
6. Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth, "Lending to the 'Borrower from Hell': Debt Sustainability in the Age of Philip II"
June 9, 2007
The Consequences of Crises
7. Efraim Benmelech, Michael Bordo, "The Financial Crisis of 1873 and 19th Century American Corporate Governance"
8. Marcus Miller, Lei Zhang, "Crises and Recovery in Emerging Markets: 'Phoenix Miracles' or Endogenous Growth"
Asset Market Instability
9. Giovanni Cespa, Xavier Vives, "Dynamic Trading, Asset Prices, and Bubbles"
10. Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, Mike Staunton, "Volatility and Portfolio Protection Over 107 Years"
Policy Perspectives
11. David Skeie, "Money and Modern Banking without Bank Runs"
12. Jeronimo Zettelmeyer, Olivier Jeanne and Jonathan Ostry, "Crisis Lending, Moral Hazard, and IMF Conditionality"