

Advanced Macroeconomics II
Economic Fluctuations and the Labor Market

Jordi Galí

Universitat Pompeu Fabra
June 2019

Unemployment Rate: U.S.

FRED 

— Civilian Unemployment Rate



Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

myf.red/g/k32S

Unemployment and Labor Market Imperfections

- Perfectly competitive labor market:

$$w_t = \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t \equiv mrs_t$$

\implies no involuntary unemployment

- Imperfect competition and/or other frictions:

$$w_t = \mu_t^w + \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t$$

where $\mu_t^w > 0$ is the "wage markup".

- Labor supply:

$$w_t = \sigma c_t + \varphi l_t$$


- Unemployment:

$$u_t \equiv l_t - n_t$$

- Unemployment and the wage markup:

$$\mu_t^w = \varphi u_t$$

Figure 1. The Wage Markup and the Unemployment Rate



Example (I): Monopoly union

$$\max_{W_t} U(C_t, N_t)$$

subject to:

$$C_t = W_t N_t + \Pi_t$$

$$N_t = W_t^{-\epsilon_w} X_t$$

Optimal wage setting:

$$W_t = \frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1} MRS_t$$

Define $\mu^w \equiv \log \frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1}$ and assuming $MRS_t = C_t^\sigma N_t^\varphi$

$$w_t = \mu^w + \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t$$

$$u_t = \frac{\mu^w}{\varphi} \equiv u$$

\implies constant unemployment rate

Example (II): Wage rigidities

"Target" vs. actual wages:

$$w_t^* = \mu^w + \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t$$

$$w_t = \mu_t^w + \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t$$

Implication:

$$w_t - w_t^* = \varphi(u_t - u^*)$$

where $u^* = \frac{\mu^w}{\varphi}$ ("natural rate of unemployment").

Example:

$$w_t = \gamma w_{t-1} + (1 - \gamma)w_t^*$$

Thus,

$$u_t - u^* = \gamma(u_{t-1} - u^*) - (\gamma/\varphi)\Delta w_t^*$$

Assuming $Y_t = C_t = N_t$:

$$u_t - u^* = \gamma(u_{t-1} - u^*) - (\gamma/\varphi)(\sigma + \varphi)\Delta y_t$$

\Rightarrow persistent, countercyclical fluctuations in unemployment

Example (III): Hysteresis (Blanchard-Summers)

Assumption: Wage set in advance, with an employment target n_t^*

$$E_{t-1}\{n_t\} = n_t^*$$

"Insider-outsider" assumption: $n_t^* = n_{t-1}$

Implication:

$$n_t = n_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$


Assuming a constant labor supply $l_t = l$:

$$u_t = u_{t-1} - \varepsilon_t^a$$


\implies permanent effect on unemployment of any shock!

A model for Europe?

Unemployment rate: U.S. vs Euro Area



Unemployment rate: U.S. , Euro Area and Spain



Search and Matching Models of Unemployment

- Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (Nobel Prize 2010)
- Labor market frictions: "matching function"

$$H_t = Z_t V_t^\theta U_t^{1-\theta}$$

- Evolution of employment:

$$N_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)N_t + H_t$$

- Unemployment rate:

$$U_t = 1 - N_t$$

- Vacancy posting cost: k

- Job finding rate:

$$\frac{H_t}{U_t} = Z_t \left(\frac{V_t}{U_t} \right)^\theta = Z_t x_t^\theta$$

where $x_t \equiv V_t/U_t$ is an index of "labor market tightness"

- Vacancy filling rate:

$$\frac{H_t}{V_t} = Z_t \left(\frac{V_t}{U_t} \right)^{-(1-\theta)} = Z_t x_t^{-(1-\theta)}$$

- *Beveridge curve*

$$\begin{aligned} Z_t V_t^\theta U_t^{1-\theta} &= \delta N_t + \Delta N_{t+1} \\ &= \delta(1 - U_t) - \Delta U_{t+1} \end{aligned}$$


In steady state:

$$V^\theta = \frac{\delta(1 - U)}{ZU^{1-\theta}}$$

Labor Market Tightness

FRED 

— Total Unfilled Job Vacancies for the United States/Unemployment Level/1000




Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions

Sources: BLS, OECD

myf.red/g/k6JM

The Beveridge Curve

United States, December 2000–March 2016



- Employment and unemployment dynamics

$$N_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)N_t + Z_t x_t^\theta U_t$$

$$U_{t+1} = \delta + (1 - \delta - Z_t x_t^\theta) U_t$$

- Steady state:

$$U = \frac{\delta}{\delta + Zx^\theta}$$

- Firm's *surplus* from an existing employment relation (assuming $Y_t = A_t N_t$)

$$\mathcal{S}_t^F = A_t - W_t + \beta(1 - \delta)E_t\{\mathcal{S}_{t+1}^F\}$$

- Optimal hiring policy:

$$k = Z_t x_t^{-(1-\theta)} \beta E_t\{\mathcal{S}_{t+1}^F\}$$

- Steady state

$$\mathcal{S}^F = \frac{A - W}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)}$$
$$\Rightarrow x^{1-\theta} = \left(\frac{Z}{k}\right) \left(\frac{\beta(A - W)}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)}\right)$$

- Implications:

$$\uparrow A \implies \uparrow x \implies \downarrow U$$

$$\uparrow W \implies \downarrow x \implies \uparrow U$$

$$\uparrow k \implies \downarrow x \implies \uparrow U$$

$$\uparrow \delta \implies \downarrow x \implies \uparrow U$$

$$\uparrow Z \implies \uparrow x \implies \downarrow U$$