The Basic New Keynesian Model

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Introduction

Evidence on Monetary Policy, Output, and Prices:

- Short run effects of monetary policy shocks

  (i) persistent effects on real variables
  (ii) slow adjustment of aggregate price level
  (iii) liquidity effect

- Micro evidence on price and wage-setting behavior: significant rigidities

Failure of Classical Monetary Models

Key ingredients of the NK Model

- monopolistic competition
- nominal rigidities

Estimated Dynamic Response to a Monetary Policy Shock



Federal funds rate



GDP



GDP deflator



M2

Source: Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999)

Micro Evidence on Price Rigidities: An Illustration



Source: Dhyne et al. (JEP 2006)

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The Basic New Keynesian Model: Key Blocks

- *Assumptions:*

  - monopolistic competition in the goods market
  - staggered price setting

- *New Keynesian Phillips Curve*

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} + \kappa_p \widetilde{y}_t$$

where $\pi_t \equiv p_t - p_{t-1}$ and $\widetilde{y}_t \equiv y_t - y_t^n$

- *Dynamic IS Equation*

$$\widetilde{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - r_t^n) + E_t\{\widetilde{y}_{t+1}\}$$

- *Monetary Policy Rule*

$$i_t = \rho + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y \widehat{y}_t + v_t$$

where $\widehat{y}_t \equiv y_t - y$

Households

Representative household solves

$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U\left(C_t, N_t; Z_t\right)$$

where $\beta \equiv \frac{1}{1+\rho}$

$$C_t \equiv \left[\int_0^1 C_t(i)^{1-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} di\right]^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

subject to

$$\int_0^1 P_t(i) C_t(i) di + B_t \leq B_{t-1}(1+i_{t-1}) + W_t N_t + D_t$$

for $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$ plus solvency constraint.

1. Optimal allocation of expenditures

$$C_t(i) = \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} C_t$$

where

$$P_t \equiv \left[\int_0^1 P_t(i)^{1-\epsilon} di\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

Implication:

$$\int_0^1 P_t(i) C_t(i) di = P_t C_t$$

2. Other optimality conditions

$$-\frac{U_{n,t}}{U_{c,t}} = \frac{W_t}{P_t}$$

$$U_{c,t} = \beta(1+i_t) E_t \left\{ U_{c,t+1} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right\}$$

Specification of utility:

$$U(C_t, N_t; Z_t) = \left(\frac{C_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{N_t^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right) Z_t$$

where $z_t \equiv \log Z_t = \rho_z z_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^z$

Log-linearized optimality conditions

$$w_t - p_t = \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t \equiv mrs_t$$

$$c_t = E_t\{c_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}^p\} - \rho) + \frac{1}{\sigma}(1-\rho_z)z_t$$

Firms

- Continuum of firms, indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$
- Each firm produces a differentiated good
- Identical technology

$$Y_t(i) = A_t N_t(i)$$

where $a_t \equiv \log A_t = \rho_a a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^a$

- Isoelastic demand $\Rightarrow$ constant desired markup $\mathcal{M} \equiv \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}$ under flexible prices
- Probability of being able to reset price in any given period: $1 - \theta$, independent across firms (Calvo (1983))
- $\theta \in [0, 1]$: index of price stickiness
- Implied average price duration $\frac{1}{1-\theta}$

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve

- *Price level dynamics*

$$P_t = \left[\theta (P_{t-1})^{1-\epsilon} + (1-\theta)(P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

  Log-linearized version:

$$p_t = \theta p_{t-1} + (1-\theta) p_t^*$$

- *Optimal Price Setting*

$$\max_{P_t^*} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+k} (1/P_{t+k}) \left(P_t^* Y_{t+k|t} - \mathcal{C}_{t+k}(Y_{t+k|t}) \right) \right\}$$

  subject to

$$Y_{t+k|t} = \left(\frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}} \right)^{-\epsilon} C_{t+k}$$

  for $k = 0, 1, 2, ...$ where $\Lambda_{t,t+k} \equiv \beta^k U_{c,t+k} / U_{c,t}$

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve

- Optimal Price Setting (cont.)

  Optimality condition:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k E_t \left\{ \Lambda_{t,t+k} Y_{t+k|t} (1/P_{t+k}) \left(P_t^* - \mathcal{M} \Psi_{t+k} \right) \right\} = 0$$

  Log-linearized version:

$$p_t^* = \mu + (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta\theta)^k E_t \{ \psi_{t+k} \}$$

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve

- *Inflation and the Markup Gap*

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \lambda(\mu_t - \mu)$$

where $\mu \equiv \log \mathcal{M}$, $\mu_t \equiv p_t - \psi_t$ and $\lambda \equiv \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta}$

- *Average Markup*

$$\mu_t = p_t - (w_t - a_t)$$

- *Labor Market Clearing*

$$w_t - p_t = \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t$$

$$n_t = y_t - a_t$$

- *Goods Market Clearing*

$$y_t = c_t$$

- *Average Markup and the Output Gap*

$$\mu_t = (1+\varphi)a_t - (\sigma+\varphi)y_t$$

Under flexible prices:

$$\mu = (1+\varphi)a_t - (\sigma+\varphi)y_t^n$$

Combining both:

$$\mu_t - \mu = -(\sigma+\varphi)\,\widetilde{y}_t$$

- *The New Keynesian Phillips Curve*

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} + \kappa \widetilde{y}_t$$

where $\kappa \equiv \lambda\,(\sigma+\varphi)$

- Some properties:

(i) Forward-looking

$$\pi_t = \kappa \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta^k E_t\{\widetilde{y}_{t+k}\}$$

$\Rightarrow$ no role for past inflation

(ii) No tradeoff between output gap and inflation stabilization

$\Rightarrow$ "the Divine Coincidence"

$\Rightarrow$ costless disinflations

(iii) Model-based vs. traditional output gap

$$\widehat{y}_t = y_t - f(t)$$

$$\widetilde{y}_t \equiv y_t - y_t^n$$

$\Rightarrow$ may distort empirical assessments

The Dynamic IS Equation

- Euler equation + goods market clearing

$$y_t = E_t\{y_{t+1}\} - \frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - \rho) + \frac{1}{\sigma}(1 - \rho_z)z_t$$

Combined with $\widetilde{y}_t \equiv y_t - y_t^n$

$$\widetilde{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - r_t^n) + E_t\{\widetilde{y}_{t+1}\}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} r_t^n &\equiv \rho + \sigma E_t\{\Delta y_{t+1}^n\} + (1 - \rho_z)z_t \\ &= \rho - \frac{\sigma(1+\varphi)(1-\rho_a)}{\sigma + \varphi} a_t + (1 - \rho_z)z_t \end{aligned}$$

Monetary Policy

- Interest rate rule

$$i_t = \rho + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y \widehat{y}_t + v_t$$

- The role of monetary aggregates

  - money demand (ad hoc):

$$m_t - p_t = y_t - \eta i_t$$

  - implied money growth:

$$\Delta m_t = \pi_t + \Delta y_t - \eta \Delta i_t$$

- *New Keynesian Phillips Curve*

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} + \kappa_p \widetilde{y}_t$$

- *Dynamic IS Equation*

$$\widetilde{y}_t = -\frac{1}{\sigma}(i_t - E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} - r_t^n) + E_t\{\widetilde{y}_{t+1}\}$$

where

$$r_t^n = \rho - \frac{\sigma(1+\varphi)(1-\rho_a)}{\sigma+\varphi} a_t + (1-\rho_z) z_t$$

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where $\widehat{y}_t \equiv y_t - y$

Equilibrium Dynamics

- *System of difference equations:*

$$\begin{bmatrix} \widetilde{y}_t \\ \pi_t \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{A}_T \begin{bmatrix} E_t\{\widetilde{y}_{t+1}\} \\ E_t\{\pi_{t+1}\} \end{bmatrix} + \mathbf{B}_T \ u_t$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} u_t &\equiv \widehat{r}_t^n - \phi_y \widehat{y}_t^n - v_t \\ &= -\frac{(1+\varphi)(\phi_y + \sigma(1-\rho_a))}{\sigma+\varphi} a_t + (1-\rho_z) z_t - v_t \end{aligned}$$

$$\mathbf{A}_T \equiv \Omega \begin{bmatrix} \sigma & 1-\beta\phi_\pi \\ \sigma\kappa & \kappa + \beta(\sigma+\phi_y) \end{bmatrix} \quad ; \quad \mathbf{B}_T \equiv \Omega \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \kappa \end{bmatrix}$$

with $\Omega \equiv \frac{1}{\sigma+\phi_y+\kappa\phi_\pi}$

- Uniqueness condition (Bullard and Mitra):

$$\kappa(\phi_\pi - 1) + (1-\beta)\phi_y > 0$$

- Analytical solution (method of undetermined coefficients)

Equilibrium uniqueness under the simple interest rate rule



Equilibrium Dynamics

- Calibration (Galí (2015))

  Households: $\sigma = 1$; $\varphi = 5$; $\beta = 0.99$; $\epsilon = 9$; $\eta = 4$; $\rho_z = 0.5$

  Firms: $\alpha = 1/4$; $\theta = 3/4$; $\rho_a = 0.9$

  Policy rules: $\phi_\pi = 1.5$, $\phi_y = 0.125$; $\rho_v = 0.5$

- Dynamic Responses to Exogenous Shocks

  (i) Monetary policy
  (ii) Discount factor
  (iii) Technology

Dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock: Interest rate rule



Dynamic responses to a discount rate shock: Interest rate rule



Dynamic responses to a technology shock: Interest rate rule



Estimated Effects of Technology Shocks



FIGURE 4. ESTIMATED IMPULSE RESPONSES FROM A FIVE-VARIABLE MODEL: U.S. DATA, FIRST-DIFFERENCED HOURS (POINT ESTIMATES AND ±2 STANDARD ERROR CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)

Source: Galí (1999)

Estimated Effects of Technology Shocks



Source: Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006)