

# The New Keynesian Model with Sticky Wages and Prices

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June 2016

# The New Keynesian Model with Sticky Prices and Wages

- Fraction of households/trade unions adjusting nominal wage:  $1 - \theta_w$
- Constant elasticity of labor demand  $\epsilon_w$

flexible wages  $\Rightarrow w_t = \mu^w + mrs_t + p_t$  where  $\mu^w \equiv \log\left(\frac{\epsilon_w}{\epsilon_w - 1}\right)$

- Aggregate wage dynamics

$$w_t = \theta_w w_{t-1} + (1 - \theta_w) w_t^*$$

- Optimal wage setting rule:

$$w_t^* = \mu^w + (1 - \beta\theta_w) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta\theta_w)^k E_t\{mrs_{t+k|t} + p_{t+k}\}$$

where  $mrs_{t+k|t} \equiv \sigma c_t + \varphi n_{t+k|t}$

- Implied wage inflation equation

$$\pi_t^w = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}^w\} - \lambda_w (\mu_t^w - \mu^w)$$

where  $\mu_t^w \equiv (w_t - p_t) - mrs_t$ ,  $mrs_t \equiv \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t$  and

$$\lambda_w \equiv \frac{(1 - \beta\theta_w)(1 - \theta_w)}{\theta_w(1 + \varphi\epsilon_w)}$$

- The New Keynesian Phillips curve revisited

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_t^p &= p_t - (w_t - a_t) \\ &= a_t - (\mu_t^w + \sigma c_t + \varphi n_t) \\ &= (1 + \varphi)a_t - (\sigma + \varphi)y_t - \mu_t^w\end{aligned}$$

implying

$$\hat{\mu}_t^p = -(\sigma + \varphi)\tilde{y}_t - \hat{\mu}_t^w$$

which combined with the inflation equation yields

$$\pi_t^p = \beta E_t\{\pi_{t+1}^p\} + \kappa_p \tilde{y}_t + \lambda_p \hat{\mu}_t^w$$

⇒ tradeoff between output gap and inflation stabilization

- *Natural* equilibrium allocation is no longer feasible

$$\hat{\mu}_t^p = \hat{\mu}_t^w = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \pi_t^p = \pi_t^w = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{constant real wage}$$

# Some Results





- Welfare losses (second order approximation)

$$\mathbb{L} = (\sigma + \varphi) \text{var}(\tilde{y}_t) + \frac{\epsilon_p}{\lambda_p} \text{var}(\pi_t^p) + \frac{\epsilon_w}{\lambda_w} \text{var}(\pi_t^w)$$

⇒ strict price inflation targeting is no longer optimal

- Optimal Policy (fig.)

Figure 6.3 Dynamic Responses to a Technology Shock under the Optimal Monetary Policy



# Some Results

- Welfare losses (second order approximation)

$$\mathbb{L} = (\sigma + \varphi) \text{var}(\tilde{y}_t) + \frac{\epsilon_p}{\lambda_p} \text{var}(\pi_t^p) + \frac{\epsilon_w}{\lambda_w} \text{var}(\pi_t^w)$$

$\implies$  strict price inflation targeting is no longer optimal

- Optimal Policy (fig.)
- "Composite inflation" and the output gap

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \{ \pi_{t+1} \} + \kappa \tilde{y}_t$$

where

$$\pi_t \equiv (1 - \vartheta) \pi_t^p + \vartheta \pi_t^w$$

with  $\vartheta \equiv \frac{\lambda_p}{\lambda_p + \lambda_w} \in [0, 1]$  and  $\kappa \equiv \frac{\lambda_w \kappa_p}{\lambda_p + \lambda_w}$

- Evaluation of Alternatives Policies (see table and fig.)

(i) Strict inflation targeting:  $\pi_t^x = 0$  (price, wage or composite)

(ii) Flexible inflation targeting:  $i_t = 1.5 \pi_t^x$

**Table 6.1** Evaluation of Simple Rules

	<i>Optimal</i>	<i>Strict Targeting</i>			<i>Flexible Targeting</i>		
		Price	Wage	Composite	Price	Wage	Composite
<i>Technology shocks</i>							
$\sigma(\pi^p)$	0.11	0	0.13	0.12	0.29	0.24	0.24
$\sigma(\pi^w)$	0.03	0.26	0	0.02	0.23	0.16	0.16
$\sigma(\tilde{y})$	0.04	3.38	0.20	0	0.84	1.18	1.11
$\mathbb{L}$	0.0330	0.78	0.039	0.0337	0.47	0.305	0.307
<i>Demand shocks</i>							
$\sigma(\pi^p)$	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.04	0.03
$\sigma(\pi^w)$	0	0	0	0	0.05	0.06	0.06
$\sigma(\tilde{y})$	0	0	0	0	1.08	1.05	1.06
$\mathbb{L}$	0	0	0	0	0.061	0.067	0.066